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NEGOTIATION IMPASSES: THE ROAD TO
RESOLUTION
BEVERLY K. SCHAFFER*
F THE PARTIES to collective bargaining reach an im-
passe, how is the dispute resolved? In both the private sec-
tor and the federal sector, mediators provide valuable assis-
tance to the parties, frequently enabling them to resolve their
dispute. In the private sector, however, work stoppages and
the threat of work stoppages provide the real incentive for the
parties to reach an agreement. A statute prohibits such work
stoppages in the federal sector.1 Federal employees who par-
ticipate in a strike, assert the right to strike, or maintain
membership in an organization which they know asserts the
right to strike against the federal government, violate the law
* Professor of Economics, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia; Member, Federal
Service Impasses Panel. The author is solely responsible for the material and views
expressed herein.
1 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1966) provides:
An individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of
the United States or the government of the District of Columbia if he
(3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the
Government of the United States or of individuals employed by the
government of the District of Columbia that he knows asserts the right
to strike against the Government of the United States or the govern-
ment of the District of Columbia; or
(4) is a member of an organization of employees of the Goverment of
the United States or of individuals employed by the government of the
District of Columbia that he knows asserts the right to strike against
the Government of the United States or the government of the District
of Columbia.
5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(2)(B)(v)(1978) excludes "any person who participates in a strike
in violation of" 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1966) from the definition of an "employee."
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and may be denied federal employment, fined up to $1,000
and/or imprisoned for up to one year and a day.2 Any labor
organization which calls or participates in a work stoppage, or
condones such activity by failing to take action to prevent or
end it engages in an unfair labor practices which may result in
the labor organization's decertification as an exclusive bar-
gaining representative or result in other appropriate discipli-
nary actions.' How then are impasses in collective negotia-
tions in the federal sector resolved? What procedures and
techniques are available and how well do they operate? This
article attempts to answer these questions for that portion of
the federal service covered by Title VII of the Civil Servcice
Reform Act of 1978."
Title VII, the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1966); 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1966) (establishes the criminal penalties
for violations of 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1966)).
5 C.F.R. § 731.201 (1975) permits the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to
deny an applicant examination, deny an eligible appointment, and instruct an agency
to remove an appointee when the OPM determines that this action will promote the
efficiency of the federal service. Such determination may be made on the basis of
"(a)ny statutory disqualification which makes the individual unfit for the service." 5
C.F.R. § 731.202(b)(8) (1975). Thus, OPM could base a decision to remove an em-
ployee on the finding of a violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1966). When a person is thus
disqualified for federal employment, "OPM in its discretion, may deny that person
examination for and appointment to a competitive position for a period of not more
than 3 years from the date of determination of disqualification. On expiration of the
period of debarment, the person who has been debarred may not be appointed to any
position in the competitive service until his fitness for appointment has been redeter-
mined by OPM." 5 C.F.R. § 731.303 (1968) as amended. Any employee whom OPM
debars from employment or his agency may appeal the removal to the Merit Systems
Protection Board. 5 C.F.R. § 731.401 (1974) as amended.
5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7)(A), (B)(1978).
5 U.S.C. § 7120(f)(1978). Exercising its authority under this provision, the Fed-
eral Labor Relations Authority revoked the exclusive recognition status of the Profes-
sional Air Traffic Controllers in a decision issued on October 22, 1981. The Authority
found that PATCO willfully and intentionally called, participated in and condoned
the strike which began at the start of the day shift on August 3, 1981. Accordingly,
FLRA revoked the organization's exclusive recognition status.
Organizations which participate in the conduct of a strike against the federal gov-
ernment or impose a duty or obligation to conduct, assist, or participate in such a
strike fall outside of the definition of a "labor organization" under 5 U.S.C. §
7103(a)(4) (1978) and, therefore, enjoy no rights accorded to labor organizations by
Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act. 5 U.S.C. § 7101-7135 (1978).
5 5 U.S.C. § 7101-7135 (1978). Coverage includes the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion and many of its employees.
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Statute (the Statute)' provides several procedures for the res-
olution of negotiation impasses: (1) voluntary arrangements,
including mediation; (2) binding arbitration pursuant to a
procedure agreed upon by the parties; and (3) assistance and
arbitration by the Federal Service Impasses Panel (the
Panel).' All of these procedures will be discussed but, since
Title VII conditions the use of an agreed upon arbitration
procedure on approval by the Panel, such procedures will be
discussed in the section outlining the Panel's operations.
I. VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENTS INCLUDING MEDIATION
The Statute recognizes that parties may utilize voluntary
arrangements, including mediation, to resolve an impasse.8
While it permits mediation by any third party, it directs the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) to pro-
vide "services and assistance to agencies and exclusive repre-
sentatives in the resolution of negotiation impasses."' The
FMCS is authorized to determine under what circumstances
and in what manner it will provide such assistance.10 Current
FMCS rules and regulations require the party initiating col-
lective bargaining to file a notice with the Service at least 30
days prior to the expiration or modification date of an existing
agreement."1 Parties entering negotiations for an initial agree-
ment must file such notice within 30 days after the com-
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 7119 (1978). The composition and function of the Federal Service Im-
passes Panel are discussed below. The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Statute also permits the use of informational picketing which does not interfere with
an agency's operations. 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b) (1978).
5 U.S.C. § 7119(b) (1978) provides:
If voluntary arrangements, including the services of the Federal Medi-
ation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) or any other third-party medi-
ation, fail to resolve a negotiation impasse ...
(1) either party may request the Federal Service Impasses
Panel to consider the matter, or
(2) the parties may agree to adopt a procedure for binding ar-
bitration of the negotiation impasse, but only if the procedure is
approved by the Panel.
5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(1) (1978).
1o Id.
" 29 C.F.R. § 1425.2 (1980).
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mencement of negotiations."2 Parties entering negotiations for
mid-term negotiations or impact bargaining may, but need
not, submit a notice.13 It is through these notices and requests
by the parties that FMCS becomes involved in federal sector
collective bargaining, standing ready to assist the parties in
resolving their dispute. The service assisted in the resolution
of many negotiation impasses.
In addition to mediation, the parties may employ other vol-
untary arrangements to resolve an impasse. These include
factfinding with or without recommendations, consultation,
and other arrangements. In one case, for example, the parties
agreed to a scheme whereby FMCS would make recommenda-
tions based on the last-best-offer of the parties.'4 Bargaining
then resumed and the parties settled 216 of 225 unsettled is-
sues on their own, leaving only nine for FMCS recommen-
dations."5
II. ASSISTANCE AND ARBITRATION BY THE FEDERAL SERVICE
IMPASSES PANEL
A. The Structure of the Panel
Executive Order 11491 orginally established the Federal
Service Impasses Panel to assist the parties in resolving nego-
tiation impasses. 6 It provided for a Panel consisting of at
12 Id.
13 Id.
1, Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service and National Treasury
Employees Union, 80 Federal Reserve Impasses Panel 68 (December 24, 1980), Panel
Release No. 177 (January 7, 1981).
5 Gov'T. EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 938:7 (November 16, 1981). Following a request
for the Panel's consideration of the nine issues still at impasse, the parties resumed
negotiations and resolved all but one issue. The Panel subsequently resolved the re-
maining issue on the basis of factfinding with recommendations by a Panel designee
followed by a Panel decision and order.
1 Exec. Order No. 11491, §§ 5, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1334 (Oct. 29, 1969).
In 1969 President Nixon appointed a Study Committee to evaluate the seven years of
experience under the Presidential policies governing relationships between labor or-
ganizations and agencies in the executive branch - policies which Executive Order
10988 established in January 1962. The Committee found the then current policies
lacking any express procedures for use in the event of impasses in collective bargain-
ing. To fill this void, the Committee recommended the creation of a Federal Service
Impasses Panel to assist in resolving negotiation impasses. It called for the use of
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least three members, appointed by the President, one of
whom was to be designated as Chairman. 17 The order, how-
ever, did not specify the terms of office. President Nixon ap-
pointed seven persons in August of 1970, and in that year the
Panel began its operations.
Title VII also provides for a Panel, consisting of a Chairman
and at least six other members, to assist in the resolution of
negotiation impasses. 8 The President appoints members from
among individuals who are familiar with Government opera-
tions and knowledgeable in labor-management relations solely
on the basis of fitness to perform the duties and functions in-
volved."' While appointments are for overlapping five-year
terms,2" the President may remove any member at any time.21
Aided by a permanent staff located in Washington, D.C.,22
panel members serve on a part-time basis to the extent dic-
tated by case load and other responsibilities.
B. Invoking the Panel's Procedures
If voluntary arrangements, including mediation, fail to re-
solve an impasse, either party, the FMCS, or the Panel's Ex-
ecutive Director may request the Federal Service Impasse
factfinding and recommendations. It also recommended, however, that the Panel be
empowered to take whatever action it deems necessary to bring a dispute to settle-
ment. Study Committee, Report and Recommendations Which Led to the Issuance
of Executive Order 11491, Recommendation F (August 1969).
17 Exec. Order No. 11491, § 5 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1334 (OCT. 29, 1969).
5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(1), (2) (1978).
" 5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(2) (1978). The Panel is an independent entity within the Fed-
eral Labor Relations Authority, an agency established pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7104
(1978) to administer the labor-management relations program in the federal service.
20 5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(3) (1978). Of the original members appointed under the Stat-
ute, two were appointed for a term of one year, two for a term of three years, and the
remaining members and the Chairman for a term of five years. Anyone appointed to
fill a vacancy is appointed to the unexpired term of the member replaced. Id.
11 5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(3) (1978). While the Statute permits the President to remove
any member of the Panel at will, it also establishes professional qualifications for
members and specific terms of office. Any attempt to politicize the Panel will likely
result in a serious diminution of the Panel's effectiveness in resolving negotiation im-
passes and redound to the detriment of the labor-management relations program.
"2 5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(4) (1978). The Statute provides that the Panel may appoint
an Executive Director and any other individuals it may from time to time find neces-
sary for the proper performance of its duties. Id.
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Panel to consider the matter." Alternatively, the parties may
request the Panel's approval of an outside arbitration proce-
dure which they have agreed to adopt.' In responding to such
requests, the Panel initially conducts an investigation to de-
termine the status of negotiations, including the extent of me-
diation assistance and the use of other voluntary
arrangements.'8
The Panel may then decline to assert its jurisdiction if it
finds that no impasse exists or for other good cause shown,
such as the existence of a threshold question concerning a
party's obligation to bargain over a proposal.' 6 When declin-
ing jurisdiction, the Panel generally directs the parties to take
appropriate action such as resuming negotiations, frequently
with FMCS assistance, or invoking the procedures for resolv-
ing questions concerning the duty to bargain. 7 The Panel,
" 5 U.S.C. § 7119(b)(1) (1978) permits either party to request the Panel to con-
sider an impasse. 5 C.F.R. § 2471.1(a) (1980) permits FMCS and the Executive Direc-
tor of the Panel to request the Panel's consideration of an impasse.
24 5 U.S.C. § 7119(b)(2) (1978). The parties may not utilize an agreed upon outside
binding arbitration procedure without the approval of the Panel. Id.
"B Under 5 C.F.R. § 2471.3(a)(3), (b)(3) (1980), the parties must include the num-
ber, length, and dates of negotiation and mediation sessions held, including the na-
ture and extent of all voluntary arrangements utilized when filing a written request
for the Panel's consideration of an impasse or its approval of an agreed upon binding
arbitration procedure. Id.
21 5 C.F.R. § 2471.6(a)(1) (1980). The Panel's rules and regulations define "im-
passe" as that point in the negotiation of conditions of employment at which the
parties are unable to reach agreement, notwithstanding their efforts to do so by direct
negotiations and by the use of mediation or other voluntary arrangement for settle-
ment. 5 C.F.R. § 2470.2(e) (1980).
The Panel has also declined to assert jurisdiction in cases when it found that a
question concerning the Union's representation status existed. See, e.g., Minnesota
Army National Guard, State of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota and Chapter 21, As-
sociation of Civilian Technicians, Inc., 78 Federal Service Impasses Panel 59 (Decem-
ber 5, 1978), Panel Release No. 116 (February 2, 1979).
Finding some or all of the issues at impasse matters concerning the interpretation
of present collective bargaining agreements, the Panel declined jurisdiction in De-
partment of the Navy, Northern Division, U.S. Naval Base, Philadelphia, Pennsylva-
nia and Local 1430, National Federation of Federal Employees, 81 Federal Service
Impasses Panel 87 (August 10, 1981), Panel Release No. 196 (September 11, 1981);
and Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C. and
National Treasury Employees Union, 81 Federal Service Impasses Panel 47 (August
10, 1981.), Panel Release No. 193 (August 21, 1981).
' 5 U.S.C. §§ 7105(a) and 7117(b), (c), (d) (1978). The Statute authorizes the Fed-
eral Labor Relations Authority, and not the Federal Service Impasse Panel, to resolve
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however, may not decline to assert its jurisdiction in cases
where the issues being discussed by the parties potentially fall
outside the scope of bargaining under Title VII. Instead, the
Panel may invoke its procedures hoping thereby to offer the
parties an opportunity to discuss their problems and to reach
a voluntary settlement."6
C. Requests for Approval of Agreed Upon Arbitration
Procedures
As Table 1 indicates, prior to 1978, the Panel received no
requests for its approval of agreed upon outside binding arbi-
tration procedures. Since 1978, the parties presented 14 such
requests to the Panel. While inclined to approve such proce-
dures, the Panel nevertheless rejects requests when it deter-
mines that the parties could utilize the procedure without au-
thorization from the Panel, such as when the procedures
involve advisory rather than binding arbitration or when the
savings clause of the Statute renders such approval unneces-
sary. 9 The Panel withholds its approval of procedures con-
tained in current agreements which could facilitate the resolu-
tion of future, rather than present, negotiation impasses.
Responding to the needs of these parties, however, the Panel
amended its rules and regulations by including provisions for
the expeditious handling of requests for approval of binding
arbitration procedures already contained in the parties' nego-
questions concerning a party's duty to bargain over a proposal. Id.
$8 In two recent cases, the Panel asserted its jurisdiction even though questions
concerning negotiability existed concerning some of the issues at impasse. For a dis-
cussion of these cases, see infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
5 U.S.C. § 7135(a) (1978) provides:
(a) Nothing contained in this chapter shall preclude...
(1) the renewal or continuation of an exclusive recognition,
certification of an exclusive representative, or a lawful agree-
ment between an agency and an exclusive representative of its
employees, which is entered into before the effective date of this
chapter.
Exec. Order No. 11491, § 5 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1334 (Oct. 29, 1969) con-
tained a similar provision which provided for the continuation of lawful agreements
entered into by an agency and a representative of its employees before the effective
date of Exec. Order No. 10988 (January 17, 1962).
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tiated agreement.3 0
D. Consideration of an Impasse by the Panel
Table I also reveals that the years since the Panel's incep-
tion witnessed a steady, and lately, a dramatic increase in the
number of requests for the Panel's consideration of impasses.
In all cases where the Panel asserts its jurisdiction, as a first
step, it either recommends procedures to the parties or it as-
sists them in resolving their dispute.3 1 Only after completing
this step does the Panel take whatever action it considers ap-
propriate to resolve the dispute.32
The Panel may recommend any procedure not prohibited
by law which it believes will encourage the voluntary resolu-
tion of the impasse. Possible procedures include: factfinding
with or without recommendations; outside binding arbitration
according to whatever procedure the Panel deems appropri-
ate; or a combination of mediation and arbitration (med-arb).
Assistance by the Panel may take many forms: mediation
and conciliation, factfinding with or without recommenda-
tions, consultation, or other means of establishing a climate
conducive to the voluntary resolution of the impasse.3 The
S 5 C.F.R. § 2471.6(b) (1980).
31 5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(5)(A)(i) to (ii) (1978); 5 C.F.R. § 2471.6(a)(2) (1980).
3, 5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(5)(B) (1978); 5 C.F.R. § 2471.11 (1980).
31 Under the Order, confusion developed concerning the roles of FMCS and the
Panel. Debate centered on whether or not the Order permitted the Panel to use medi-
ation to resolve disputes or whether such efforts constituted an improper derogation
of the role of FMCS. In 1978, FMCS and the Panel attempted to resolve this confu-
sion and debate by agreeing that the Panel would refrain from mediation outside the
context of the prehearing conference and the factfinding hearing, recognizing thereby
that settlements often take place "at the courthouse steps."
According to some, confusion continues to exist under the statute. Some agency
and union officials believe that the responsibilities of FMCS and the Panel overlap
causing unnecessary duplication and delay. FMCS also complains of the alleged du-
plication of mediation efforts which it perceives to adversely affect its ability to se-
cure voluntary settlements. According to FMCS, the parties essentially are given two
chances to take a case to mediation which it believes causes some parties to bypass
FMCS mediation in favor of settling their disputes with the Panel.
The Order perhaps produced justifiable confusion; the same, however, is not true of
the statute. The statute requires the parties to utilize voluntary arrangements, in-
cluding the services of FMCS or any other third-party mediation, before requesting
the Panel to either consider the matter or approve an agreed upon binding arbitra-
tion procedure. The statute, therefore, assigns FMCS a critical, although not an ex-
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latter could involve a hearing or a request for written submis-
sions in lieu of a hearing where the Panel leaves open the de-
termination of subsequent Panel action as a means of putting
pressure on the parties. The Panel might even resolve one or
more key issues when it determines that this would encourage
the voluntary resolution of the remaining issues at impasse. 4
When the Panel determines that it will assist the parties by
conducting a hearing, it may appoint one or more of its desig-
nees to conduct such a hearing. 5 The designated representa-
tive may conduct a prehearing conference, administer oaths,
take the testimony or deposition of any person under oath,
receive other evidence, and issue subpoenas8 The factfinder's
report may contain recommendations, but only when author-
ized by the Panel. If the parties fail to accept the factfinder's
recommendations or to otherwise resolve their dispute, they
must submit to the Panel's Executive Director a statement
setting forth reasons for not accepting the recommendations
and for not resolving all issues.8 7 If the parties reject the rec-
ommendations or the report contains no such recommenda-
tions, the Panel may take whatever action it considers appro-
priate to resolve the dispute.3 8
clusive, role in providing pre-crises mediation. The Panel may not assert its jurisdic-
tion prior to the utilization of such voluntary efforts. Even though the statute does
not require the parties to exhaust voluntary efforts before seeking the assistance of
the Panel, the Panel does not normally assert its jurisdiction until FMCS informs the
Panel that it has exhausted its efforts to resolve the dispute. Thus, the exhaustion of
voluntary efforts and the consequent creation of an impasse forms the jurisdictional
boundary line between FMCS and the Panel. Once the Panel asserts jurisdiction, the
Statute requires it to recommend procedures and/or assist the parties in the resolu-
tion of the impasse. Nothing in the legislative history of the statute indicates that
Congress intended the Panel to exclude mediation and conciliation as forms of assis-
tance it can properly render parties who reach the crisis stage in collective bargaining.
I Federal Trade Commission, Boston, Massachusetts and Local 3656, American
Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, 79 Federal Services Impasses Panel
65 and 80 Federal Services Impasses Panel 19, (May 29, 1980), Panel Release No. 152
(June 12, 1980).
" Procedures of the Federal Service Impasses Panel, 5 C.F.R. § 2471.7(a) (1980).
The Panel could designate either its Executive Director, a staff associate, a member
of the Panel, or other person to conduct a hearing.
5 C.F.R. §§ 2471.8(a)(1) (1980).
3- 5 C.F.R. § 2471.8(c) (1980).
5 C.F.R. § 2471.11(a) (1980). The Panel's discretion, however, is not completely
unfettered. Its actions may not be inconsistent with 5 U.S.C. ch. 71. 5 C.F.R. §
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Prior to 1978, the Panel responded to nearly all requests for
its consideration in a routine fashion, directing the parties to
factfinding. Following a prehearing conference and a hearing,
a staff associate issued a factfinder's report containing no rec-
ommendations. The Panel then considered the report and is-
sued its recommendations. If these recommendations failed to
produce a settlement, the Panel issued a decision and order
resolving the matter. As Table 1 shows, in the early years of
the Panel's operation, the parties reached voluntary settle-
ment in most cases either before or after recommendations by
the Panel. Few cases required a decision and order.
As the number of cases considered by the Panel, the num-
ber of issues at impasse, and the parties' apparent resistance
to voluntary settlement increased, the Panel embarked on a
different approach. When providing assistance or recom-
mending procedures to the parties, the Panel in its discretion
varies the formality or informality of the procedure on a case-
by-case basis. In exercising its discretion, the Panel seeks to
find a procedure appropriate to the facts of the case that will
produce a timely and voluntary settlement of the dispute. The
Panel encourages the parties themselves to develop proce-
dures tailored to their needs and to make these procedures
known to the Panel. Believing that the parties know best what
procedures will most effectively help them in resolving their
impasse, the Panel reviews procedural requests with a
prediliction in favor of their adoption. Disapproval will most
likely result only when the Panel considers a procedure to be
detrimental to the collective bargaining process.
If the dispute remains unresolved after the Panel recom-
mends procedures and/or assists the parties, it may then take
whatever action is necessary and not inconsistent with the
Statute to resolve the dispute."' In preparation for taking final
action, the Panel or its designee(s) may hold hearings; how-
ever, such hearings constitute just one procedural option. Al-
ternatives include, but are not limited to, directing the parties
to adopt a factfinder's recommendations where this is appro-
2471.11(a) provides the same express limitations on its power.
11 5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(5)(B)(iii) (1978); 5 C.F.R. § 2471.11(a) (1980).
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priate, ordering binding arbitration, conducted according to
whatever procedure the Panel deems suitable, and rendering a
binding decision. 0 The Panel will select that procedure which
it deems most likely to produce a satisfactory settlement of
the particular dispute. As in the earlier stages of the process,
the Panel encourages the parties to request procedures tai-
lored to their specific needs.
Notice of any final action by the Panel must be promptly
served upon the parties, and the action is binding upon them
during the term of their agreement unless they agree other-
wise. 1 Within 30 calendar days after receipt of such notice,
each party must send evidence of compliance to the Executive
Director of the Panel.42
E. Appeal and Enforcement of the Panel's Final Action
The Statute contains no provision authorizing direct ap-
peals from final decisions of the Panel. Decisions by the Fed-
eral Labor Relations Authority ("the Authority"), the Panel,
and the courts currently hold that the unfair labor practice
procedure is the exclusive means of obtaining review and en-
forcement of a final Panel decision. Finding no provision sanc-
tioning review of a final Panel decision except through the
ULP procedure set forth in the Statute, the Authority held
that review may be sought by the party objecting to the final
Panel order only after the filing of unfair labor practice
charges by the other party based on noncompliance with the
Panel's decision and order.' s The Panel concluded that no ex-
40 5 C.F.R. § 2471.11(a) (1980).
5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(5)(C) (1978); 5 C.F.R. § 2471.11(d) (1980).
42 5 C.F.R. 2471.11(e) (1980).
" The Authority clearly spelled this out in several decisions reached in late 1979
wherein it concluded that the clear intent and purpose of Congress was to establish
the unfair labor practice procedure as the exclusive means of obtaining Authority
review of final Panel decisions. Specifically in this regard, the Authority pointed to
the portion of the legislative history of the Statute concerning final orders issued by
the Panel under the Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7119(c) (1978). The House report expressly
states:
Notice of any final action of the Panel must be promptly served upon
the parties, and the action is final and binding upon the parties during
the term of the agreement, unless the parties agree otherwise. Final
action of the Panel under this section is not subject to appeal, and
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plicit provision of the Statute authorizes it to enforce its own
decisions and orders through court action," and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a decision of the Panel is
not a final order of the Authority reviewable pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 7123 (1978). 45
F. Appeal and Enforcement of Arbitration Awards Issued
Pursuant to Agreed Upon Arbitration Procedures
As noted above, the Statute permits the parties to use an
agreed upon binding arbitration procedure if the Panel ap-
proves the procedure.4 6 It appears that the unfair labor prac-
failure to comply with any final action ordered by the Panel consti-
tutes an unfair labor practice by an agency under section 7116(a)(b)
and (8) (1978) or a labor organization under section 7116(b)(6) and (8)
(1978). (Emphasis added by the Authority)
H.R. REP. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 54-55 (1978).
These provisions of section 7116 in the House bill adverted to in the report, and as
enacted without modification in the Statute, state that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for any agency or labor organization to "fail or refuse to cooperate in impasse
procedures and impasse decisions as required by this chapter;. . ." or "otherwise fail
or refuse to comply with any provision of this chapter." State of New York, Division
of Military and Naval Affairs and New York Council, Association of Civilian Techni-
cians, Inc., 2 Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. No. 20 (December 5, 1979) FLRA Report No. 22
(January 25, 1980); State of California National Guard, Sacramento, California and
Locals R12-125, R12-132, R12-146 and R12-150, National Association of Government
Employees, 2 Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. No. 21 (December 5, 1979) FLRA Report No. 22
(25 January 1980).
4, Puerto Rico Air National Guard, Santurce, Puerto Rico and Local 1665, Na-
tional Federation of Federal Employees, 78 FSIP 62 (23 April 1979) Panel Release
No. 107 (29 September 1978) and No. 110 (31 October 1978).
15 Nevada National Guard v. United States, No. 79-7235 (9th Cir. December 14,
1979).
5 U.S.C. § 7123 (1978) provides:
(a) Any person aggrieved by any final order of the Authority other
than an order under...
(1) section 7122 of this title (involving an award by an arbitra-
tor), unless the order involves an unfair labor practice under
section 7118 of this title, or
(2) section 7112 of this title (involving an appropriate unit de-
termination), may during the 60-day period beginning on the
date on which the order was issued, institute an action for judi-
cial review of the Authority's order in the United States court of
appeals in the circuit in which the person resides or transacts
business or in the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
46 5 U.S.C. § 7119(b)(2) (1978).
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tice procedure constitutes the exclusive procedure available to
a party aggrieved by the other party's failure or refusal to
comply with the agreed upon procedure. In denying a request
that it interpret and enforce a previously approved procedure
after one party's withdrawal, the Panel noted that nothing in
the Statute or in its rules and regulations gives it the author-
ity to interpret or enforce such agreements.47 The Panel also
observed that when the parties request approval of binding
arbitration procedures, it closes the case once it performs the
limited function of approving or disapproving the procedure.
If the parties employ an outside binding arbitration proce-
dure approved by the Panel, either party may file an excep-
tion to the arbitrator's award with the Authority. 8 If upon
review the Authority finds that the award is deficient (1) be-
cause it is contrary to any law, rule or regulation; or (2) other
grounds similar to those applied by Federal courts in private
sector labor-management relations; it may take such action
and make such recommendations concerning the award as it
considers necessary and consistent with applicable laws, rules,
or regulations."
If no exception to an arbitrator's award is filed during the
30-day period beginning on the date of the award, the award
becomes final and binding. The Statute requires an agency to
take the actions required by an arbitrator's award and any
person aggrieved by the failure of a party to take such action
may seek redress through the unfair labor practice
procedures.50
" Department of the Air Force, Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson
Air Force Base, Ohio and American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO,
78 Federal Service Impasses Panel 86 (18 December 1979) Panel Release No. 109 (30
October 1978).
48 5 U.S.C. § 7122 (1978) provides:
(a) Either party to arbitration under this chapter may file with the
Authority an exception to any arbitrator's award pursuant to the arbi-
tration (other than an award relating to a matter described in section
7121(f) of this title).
Section 7121(f) concerns adverse actions and removal or demotion for unacceptable
performance.
" 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a) (1978).
0 5 U.S.C. § 7122(b) (1978).
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G. Significant Developments at the Panel
As Table I shows, the Panel received 191 requests for its
assistance in fiscal year 1981, a 55 percent increase over the
number of requests received in the previous fiscal year and
the largest percentage increase in any one year in the Panel's
history. Unions filed 91 percent of all requests for assistance,
a figure which is comparable with those of previous years.
Of the 168 cases closed in fiscal year 1981, the Panel issued
decisions and orders in 73 of them. This represents 43 percent
of the cases closed, a significant increase from previous years.
Much of the increase may be attributed to the reduction in
the number of cases directed to factfinding. In many cases,
the Panel now directs the parties to submit their proposals,
evidence, and arguments in writing, promising to take appro-
priate action upon receipt of these written submissions. While
reflecting procedural preference in some cases, in others it re-
flects the growing budget constraints now besetting the Panel.
In the latter cases especially, election of this procedure
reduces the opportunity for voluntary settlement by removing
the catalytic element frequently provided by the factfinder. It
is regrettable that the Panel must function in this manner
when the Statute seeks to promote collective bargaining, not
third-party adjudication, as the means of determining condi-
tions of employment for federal employees."
Following a trend set in previous years, the Panel processed
cases more quickly in fiscal year 1981 than in fiscal year 1980.
The median time in which the Panel closed cases was 81 days
as compared with 87 days in fiscal year 1980. The Panel also
reduced the median time it took to issue a decision and order
based on written submissions to 90 days in fiscal year 1981, 14
days less than in the previous fiscal year. It issued decisions
and orders in cases involving a factfinding hearing in a me-
dian time of 168 days, up slightly from fiscal year 1980. Signif-
icant reductions in the amount of time it took for investiga-
tions to be initiated and completed, and for Panel
determinations to be made also occurred. While the Panel
11 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (1978).
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strives to perform its function in a timely fashion, it attempts
to do so in a manner consistent with the purposes of the Stat-
ute. As noted above, budget constraints dictate the selection
of written submissions in many cases and these take less time
to process. To the extent that the selection of this or any
other procedure reflects budget concerns rather than a deter-
mination that the procedure best suits the particular impasse,
the reduction of case processing time may be more a cause for
concern than for rejoicing.
The Panel's treatment of two recent cases involving ques-
tions of negotiability represents another important develop-
ment. It asserted jurisdiction in these cases even though it
usually declines to assert such jurisdiction pending resolution
of the negotiability questions. In one, the Panel directed the
parties to submit the seven issues at impasse (all involving ne-
gotiability questions) to factfinding.52 Thereafter, the parties
resolved three issues and the Panel resolved the other four on
the basis of a decision and order. All issues were settled with-
out invoking procedures to resolve the negotiability questions.
In the other case, the Panel directed the parties to submit all
issues in dispute to an outside arbitrator who would first me-
diate with respect to all issues at impasse, including those
about which negotiability questions existed.8 If mediation
fails to settle the dispute, the Panel directs the arbitrator ei-
ther to resolve any or all remaining issues or to postpone reso-
lution pending a ruling by appropriate authority on any re-
maining negotiability questions. The parties shared the cost of
this procedure. Resolution of all issues resulted.
In the recent dispute involving the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration and the Professional Air Traffic Controllers
(PATCO), the Panel might have asserted its jurisdiction even
52 Department of the Air Force, Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson
AFB, Ohio, and Council 214, American Federation of Government Employess, AFL-
CIO, 81 Federal Service Impasses Panel 53 (November 20, 1981) (Unreleased at the
time of this writing).
11 Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administation, Bal-
timore, Maryland and General Committee, American Federation of Government Em-
ployees, AFL-CIO, 81 Federal Service Impasses Panel 119, 152 (September 19, 1981)
(Unreleased at the time of this writing).
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over those issues falling outside the scope of bargaining under
Title VII, recommending procedures or assisting the parties in
an attempt to resolve their dispute. The Panel, however, re-
ceived no request for its consideration of this dispute even
though it informed the parties that its door remained open to
them. It declined to take a more active role because many is-
sues being discussed fell outside the scope of bargaining.
Whether the dispute could have been resolved by these means
remains an open question.
III. IMPASSE PROCEDURES AND FEDERAL SECTOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
While the August 1981 strike by members of PATCO drew
considerable attention, work stoppages do not characterize
federal sector collective bargaining. Federal sector collective
bargaining demonstrates a high degree of voluntarism and a
nearly perfect record of peaceful resolution of negotiation im-
passes. Of approximately 800 sets of negotiations taking place
in the federal service each year, less than 20 percent result in
requests for the Panel's consideration or for its approval of
binding arbitration procedures. The parties reach agreement
in the others by themselves, often with the assistance of
FMCS. Even when they fail to reach complete agreement,
they usually resolve most issues and reach impasse on only a
small number. As Table I shows, until fiscal year 1981 the
parties also voluntarily resolved most of the issues they
brought to the Panel, requiring final action by the Panel in
only a small proportion of them. Even in fiscal year 1981 only
a small proportion of the 800 sets of negotiations required
final action by the Panel. In nearly all cases, the parties
peacefully implemented the Panel's decision and order leaving
very few problems of enforcement.
Conventional wisdom, however, anticipates that the exis-
tence of interest arbitration will produce a "chilling effect" on
collective bargaining. While no significant chilling effect
emerged in the first nine years of the Panel's existence, an
increasing caseload and an increasing tendency for disputes to
resist voluntary resolution engender concern over the future
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prospect of a chilling effect. Initially, the parties' lack of fa-
miliarity with the Panel and their lack of sophistication in
collective bargaining may explain their limited recourse to the
Panel and their receptivity to its encouragement of voluntary
settlements. Moreover, the limited scope of bargaining pro-
vided by the Statute, and the Order before it, mitigates the
onerousness of the bargaining obligation for federal officials.
Most economic issues fall outside the scope of bargaining. The
statute, as the Order, further circumscribes the scope of nego-
tiations by including a broad management rights clause.
These limitations significantly reduce the stakes at the bar-
gaining table, thereby enhancing the possibility of voluntary
settlements. When the parties perceive the stakes to be high,
as in cases involving the attire of civilian technicians of the
national guard, collective bargaining produced fewer volun-
tary settlements and the resulting impasses more ofteii neces-
sitated final action by the Panel." In such cases, problems of
enforcement even arose.55 No case, however, resulted in a
work stoppage.
Forces now operating may produce an increasing number of
impasses and make voluntary resolution more difficult. Chief
among these is the Reagan administration's attempt to reduce
", As of December 1981, the Panel received requests to consider the uniform ques-
tion in approximately 80 cases. It issued its first decision and order involving the
uniform question in Massachusetts Air National Guard, Otis AFB, Falmouth, Massa-
chusetts and Local 3004, American Federation of Government Employees AFL-CIO,
77 Federal Service Impasses Panel 18 (December 28, 1977) Panel Release No. 87
(January 6, 1978). It ordered the parties to adopt language in their agreement permit-
ting civilian technicians, while performing their day-to-day technicians duties, the op-
tion of wearing either the military uniform or an agreed upon standard civilian attire
without display of military rank, obtained at the expense of the technician. In numer-
ous other cases involving this issue which required a decision and order, the Panel
directed the parties to adopt similar language. Employer dissatisfaction gave rise to
several requests for reconsideration which the Panel denied. In a few cases, the Panel
responded to requests for clarification.
5" See, e.g., Puerto Rico Air National Guard, Santurce, Puerto Rico and Local
1665, National Federation of Federal Employees, 78 Federal Service Impasses Panel
62 (April 23, 1979) Panel Release No. 107 (Septemper 29, 1978) and Panel Release
No. 110 (October 31, 1978).
North Carolina Air National Guard, 145th Tactical Airlift Group, Charlotte, North
Carolina and Local 3001, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO,
81 Federal Service Impasses Panel 21 (May 26, 1981) Panel Release No. 190 (July 2,
1980).
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the size of government. Undoubtedly this will generate in-
creased bargaining over difficult issues such as reductions-in-
force and the contracting-out of work. Another factor stems
from the statutory provision of official time for employees rep-
resenting an exclusive representative in collective negotiations
when they otherwise would be in a duty status." Agencies
faced with increasing budget constraints may more readily in-
voke impasse procedures as a means of cutting the use of offi-
cial time for bargaining. They may also increase their resis-
tance to demands for official time for representation
purposes.57
Decisions by the Federal Labor Relations Authority defin-
ing the parameters of bargaining under the Statute increas-
ingly require negotiations on subjects where management's re-
sistance is high. For example, a decision requiring negotiation
on stays of personnel actions generated numerous impasses
and requests for the Panel's consideration of this issue. 8
The limited scope of bargaining under Title VII may also
serve to make voluntary settlements more difficult to achieve.
Many issues of concern to federal employees remain outside
the scope of bargaining. After nearly two decades of bargain-
ing over a restricted number of issues, unions seeking to
demonstrate their worth to members and potential members
in a system which bans union security arrangements, other
than dues checkoff, may meet stiffer resistance as they de-
mand further gains in these limited areas. To the extent that
5 U.S.C. § 7131(a) (1978) provides official time for any employee representing an
exclusive representative in the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement, in-
cluding attendance at impasse proceedings, during the time the employee otherwise
would be in a duty status. The number of such employees for whom official time is
authorized may not exceed the number of individuals designated as representing the
agency for such purposes.
"1 5 U.S.C. § 7131(a) (1978) authorizes bargaining on official time for employee-
union officials performing representation functions.
" American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1999, AFL-CIO and
Army-Air Force Exchange Service, Dix-McGuire Exchange, Fort Dix, New Jersey, 2
Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. No. 16 (29 November 1979) FLRA Report No. 22 (25 January
1980). In this and other decisions relating to the procedures management will observe
in exercising any rights reserved to it by the Statute, the Authority authorized negoti-
ations on such procedures, unless such negotiations prevent the agency from acting at
all.
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unions and employees press for negotiations on matters cur-
rently outside the scope of bargaining, the possibility of
peaceful resolution procedures becomes remote. As mentioned
above, present impasse resolution procedures might have pro-
duced a peaceful settlement in the PATCO case, even though
the major issues in dispute fell outside the scope of bargaining
under Title VII. Certainly that likelihood would be greater if
those issues fell within the scope of bargaining. Should union
mergers occur to meet the growing concerns of federal em-
ployees and their representatives, demands, whether within
the scope of bargaining or not, may be expressed in a more
commanding voice than ever before. Peaceful resolution of re-
sulting disputes more certainly will be forthcoming if a viable
procedure exists which provides an opportunity for a dialogue
on the issues and the resolution of the issues by objective per-
sons who are knowledgeable in labor-management relations
and in government operations.
While the number of negotiations resulting in impasse in-
creases, along with the number of issues at impasse, the pre-
sent impasse resolution procedures draw some criticism and
some suggestions for improvement. Some suggest that the
functions of FMCS and the Panel should be merged into one
agency, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of mediation
while providing arbitration by a permanent panel as a final
means of resolving disputes. Undoubtedly there is some merit
to this proposal. Others suggest a more limited step in this
direction. For example, Frank Ferris, Director of Training and
Negotiations for the National Treasury Employees Union, rec-
ommends giving FMCS authority to make recommendations
for the settlement of impasses following a hearing. These rec-
ommendations would be binding unless either party could
show cause why the Panel should review them." Alterna-
tively, he suggests that the Panel be replaced by ad hoc arbi-
tration of all impasses with the Federal Labor Relations Au-
thority being empowered to stay arbitration awards upon a
showing of irreparable harm to one of the parties. A bill re-
19 GOVT. EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 938:8 (November 16, 1981).
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cently introduced in the House contemplates a lock-step pro-
cedure involving mediation, factfinding, and arbitration with
the factfinders and arbitrators selected on an ad hoc basis.60
No impasse resolution procedure functions without its crit-
ics. The evidence suggests, however, that the present proce-
dures in the federal sector work effectively. Title VII gives the
Panel broad authority to resolve impasses. Exercising this au-
thority and its ingenuity to meet changes in the climate of
bargaining and the needs of the parties in each case, the Panel
shapes its response to requests for its assistance so as to en-
courage the timely and voluntary resolution of disputes. The
unpredictability of the Panel's response prods the parties to
reach agreement. The Panel has not exhausted the alterna-
tives available to it under Title VII to resolve impasses and,
budget permitting, it stands ready to perform its function of
encouraging the timely and voluntary resolution of disputes
whenever possible and, when this is not possible, to produce a
settlement which conforms to the objectives of Title VII.
The present structure of the Panel provides a continuity
which would be lacking under ad hoc arbitration arrange-
ments. The latter may even lead to conflicting, and in some
instances, illegal awards. Its cost would be unpredictable and
may seriously impair collective bargaining in a federal system
which does not provide union security.
The impasse resolution procedures provided by Title VII
pave the way to the peaceful resolution of disputes over issues
which fall within its scope of bargaining. The biggest threats
to the continued successful operation of these procedures
come from the limited scope of bargaining in the federal sec-
tor and the severe budget constraints currently being placed
on the Federal Service Impasses Panel.
6o H.R. 4435, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. Rac. H-6071 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1981).
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